
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Property Value Assessment Growth Limits,
Tax Base Erosion and Regional In-Migration
IZA DP No. 4906
April 2010
Mark Skidmore
Mehmet S. Tosun 
Property Value Assessment Growth 





Michigan State University  
 
Mehmet S. Tosun 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














Property Value Assessment Growth Limits, 
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In 1994 a limit on the growth of property values for tax purposes was imposed in Michigan. 
One consequence of the newly imposed assessment growth cap was an emerging 
differential in tax prices between potential new property owners and long-time property 
owners. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this growing tax price 
differential on migration patterns. Using county level data on migration activity over the 1994-
2006 period, we present evidence that differential tax prices resulting from the assessment 
growth cap have reduced in-migration. 
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I.  Introduction 
With the passage of Michigan’s Proposal A in 1994, a property value assessment growth limit
1 
was implemented which restricts the growth of property valuation for tax purposes to the lesser of 
rate of inflation or five percent.
2  Since that time, every year local authorities are required to 
report for each property within their jurisdiction the actual state equalized value (SEV)
3 as well as 
taxable value (TV).  In 1994 each property’s state equalized value equaled its taxable value.  
Through time, however, due to rapidly rising housing prices the growth of SEV has outpaced the 
growth of TV, resulting in tax base erosion.
4  Further, there is significant variation across 
communities in the rate at which TV has fallen behind SEV.  To illustrate the differences across 
the state in tax base erosion, consider the ratio of state equalized value to taxable value (SEV/TV) 
for all Michigan counties.  According to the Michigan Department of Treasury State Tax 
Commission, in 2006 the average SEV/TV for all counties was 1.3.  Leelanau County had the 
highest ratio of state equalized to taxable value (1.75) and Midland County had the lowest ratio of 
state equalized to taxable value (1.15).  Figure 1 shows how SEV/TV varies across Michigan 
counties, but the story of tax base erosion across regions requires some explanation.  Consider the 
lake counties in the northwest region of the Lower Peninsula.  This region experienced substantial 
growth in prime lakefront property values, and this has led to significant tax base erosion.  On the 
other hand, Bay and Genesee counties in eastern Michigan have experienced very slow growth in 
property values due to poor economic conditions, and thus have experienced relatively little tax 
base erosion resulting from the taxable value cap.  In contrast, the counties surrounding Grand 
Rapids have experienced population growth and a substantial amount of new construction, which 
has expanded the tax base.  Like Bay and Genesee Counties, these counties have experienced 
                                                 
1 Such limitations have been referred to as “assessment growth caps”, “taxable value caps”, “assessment 
growth limits”, or property tax assessment limits”.  These terms are used interchangeably throughout the 
manuscript. 
2 Feldman, Courant, and Drake (2003) provide an excellent review of property taxation in Michigan. 
3 SEV is equal to one half of estimated market value. 
4 In 2006 housing prices began to fall across the state.    
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relatively little tax base erosion, but the underlying economic and demographic conditions are 
very different.  The Grand Rapids area has experienced significant new residential development 
and this has served to keep tax base erosion in check.  Bay and Genesee Counties, however, have 
experienced long-term economic decline and flat housing prices.  In this region, tax base erosion 
is limited because housing prices have been stable or in decline.  It should also be noted that over 
the past two years average property values in Michigan have actually declined so that tax base 
erosion is now being reversed.  
   According to a new report by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Haveman and Sexton, 
2008), property value assessment growth limits exist in 19 states and the District of Columbia, of 
which 15 are imposed statewide.
5  A number of these limitations were imposed in the 1970s and 
1980s in the wake of the tax revolt.  However, in response to rapidly rising property values across 
the nation during the late 1990s and running through 2007, interest among policymakers in 
assessment growth limits was renewed and several states have imposed new restrictions.
6  
Although property tax limitations generally and assessment growth caps specifically has received 
the attention of researchers, several important dimensions of this particular type of property tax 
limitation remain largely unexplored.  In particular, the objective of this research is to determine 
the degree to which tax base erosion resulting from the taxable value cap may have affected 
regional migration patterns.  A key feature of the Michigan’s taxable value cap is that upon sale 
of a property, the taxable value increases to state equalized value.  What has become known as 
the “pop up” has resulted in a growing tax price differential between long-time and new property 
owners. We therefore expect tax base erosion resulting from the taxable value cap to discourage 
in-migration (due to the high cost of public services imposed on new property owners) and deter 
out-migration (due to the substantial loss in the tax benefit associated with moving).  To our 
knowledge, the relationship between taxable value caps and migration decisions has not yet been 
                                                 
5 We note that Michigan’s assessment growth cap applies to all property types, whereas in many states the 
assessment growth caps apply to residential property only.   
6 Illinois and Washington are two recent examples.    
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examined by researchers.  In this paper, we focus on in-migration although we also present some 
analysis of out-migration as well. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we provide an 
outline of Michigan’s property value assessment growth limit and other pertinent property tax 
policies.  We then provide a review of the most relevant research regarding property value 
assessment growth limits as well as related research on migration patterns.  In section IV, we 
present a simple framework to illustrate the determinants of tax base erosion and show how tax 
prices are altered as result of tax base erosion.  Section V presents the data and empirical analysis, 
and section VI concludes. 
 
II. The Property Tax in Michigan 
During the latter part of the 20
th century Michigan legislators as well as citizens via referenda 
processes have implemented several measures designed to protect targeted property owners from 
the property tax.  In addition to the taxable value cap, it is important to also note other key 
property tax policies such as the homestead exemption, the income tax credit, the mobile home 
park exemption, and the Headlee amendment.
7  Of particular relevance to the present study is the 
homestead exemption which was implemented jointly with the taxable value cap under 
Proposition A, and Headlee amendment which was imposed in 1978. 
  In Table 1 we present average statewide property tax millage rates from 1990 through 
2006.  Over this period, the only major change occurred in 1994 with the passage of Proposal A.  
Proposal A reduced average millage rates for all homestead properties by 34 mills.   This has 
become known as the “homestead exemption.”  The state government then added a 6 mill state 
education tax and increased sales taxes and cigarette taxes to provide for the financing of k-12 
public education.  With the exception of this major policy shift, average millage rates across the 
state have been stable, although it should be noted that property tax rates vary considerably across 
                                                 
7 These policies are clearly articulated and discussed in Feldman, Courant, and Drake (2003).    
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jurisdictions.  This stability is largely due to the implementation of the Headlee Amendment in 
1978, which restricts property tax revenue growth to the rate of inflation plus new construction.  
Importantly, under Headlee any potential revenue increases beyond the limit resulting from 
property value growth would require rate reductions to bring revenues into line with the revenue 
growth restriction.  This feature of the property tax revenue growth limit is known as the 
“Headlee Rollback.”  Local residents can, however, choose to exceed the Headlee limitation by 
referendum.  Once the taxable value cap was imposed, Headlee Rollbacks were greatly reduced in 
numbers and magnitudes. 
  Each year the State of Michigan Department of Treasury provides estimates of tax 
expenditures for all major sources of tax revenues.  The single largest property tax expenditure 
arises from the taxable value cap, and this is followed by the homestead exemption.  Tax exempt 
property is a distant third.  These three property tax expenditures make up more than three 
quarters of the total.  As of 2007, the tax expenditure associated with the taxable value cap had 
become so large that its repeal, holding total property tax revenues constant, would result in a 
reduction in the statewide average statutory tax rate of 23 percent.  In some counties the average 
statutory tax rate could be reduced by more than 40 percent. 
  The Citizens Research Council (2001) was among the first organizations in Michigan to 
highlight the growing differential between SEV and TV.  In a statewide summary, they showed 
how the ratio of taxable value to assessed value differed across regions and across types of 
property.  SEV/TV for commercial and industrial property in 2000 remained relatively high at 
1.15 and 1.08, respectively.  SEV/TV for agricultural, timber cutover and developmental 
properties, however, had all risen above 1.45.  SEV/TV for residential property had dropped to 
about 1.22.
8  While the Citizens Research Council report highlighted the potential shift in tax 
                                                 
8 The Citizens Research Council reports on changes in TV/SEV. We use SEV/TV to be consistent with our 
empirical results and interpretations later in our paper.  These numbers are simply the inverse of the 
numbers reported in Citizens Research Council (2001).  For purposes of interpreting estimation results, 
in our empirical analysis we estimate the determinants of the inverse of TV/SEV, or SEV/TV.    
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burdens across property types, it did not provide a discussion of the broader implications 
regarding the horizontal and vertical inequities that were beginning to emerge.  Given that taxable 
value caps have now existed in a number of states over a period of rapidly rising property values, 
there is now a growing body of research that has examined the effects of property value 
assessment growth limits, and it is on this work that we now focus our attention.   
 
III. Literature Review 
The early empirical research on property tax limits, including property value assessment growth 
constraints tended to focus on determining the degree to which these emerging fiscal institutions 
actually constrained property tax revenue growth.
9  More recently, however, researchers have 
turned their attention to the distributional consequences of property value assessment growth 
limits.  In 2006 the National Tax Journal devoted an entire issue to the property tax, and several 
articles evaluate the potential consequences of property tax limitations, and in particular the 
peculiar distributional consequences of property value assessment growth limits.  We review 
several key articles from this issue as well as some other recent research. 
  Dye, McMillen, and Merriman (2006) assess the implications of the recently imposed 
assessment growth cap which was introduced in Cook County, Illinois.  They demonstrate that a 
taxable cap of this nature cannot be introduced without having comparative increases in taxes for 
others.  For example, a taxable value cap that protects residential owners as in Cook County, 
Illinois will simply lead to increased taxes for industrial and commercial property owners.  They 
also show that homeowners with property that appreciates at a rate less than the cap will 
experience higher rates to make up for those who are protected.  Of particular relevance to the 
present study, they indicate that the “extent that the cap reduces the property tax payments for 
                                                 
9 See Dye and McGuire and McMillen (2005), Mullins and Joyce (1996) and Skidmore (1999) for a review 
of this literature.    
    
7
rapidly growing areas… may discourage mobility, since the expanded exemption is lost when real 
estate is sold, and, thus, may decrease the efficiency of the residential real estate market.” 
  Dye and McMillen (2007) extended work of Dye, McMillen and Merriman (2006) by 
developing a formal theoretical framework to evaluate the effects of assessment caps on property 
taxes.  Two key conclusions are: 1) “reassessment upon sale can make it expensive for 
homeowners to move, and may depress real estate markets”, and 2) the assessment limits can 
“lead to higher taxes for some property owners whose assessments had been lowered.”  To 
illustrate, Dye and McMillen report that in Minnesota 78 percent of all residential homesteads 
had to pay a higher tax as a result of taxable value cap than they would have had if taxable values 
remained unrestricted.
10  Dye and McMillen conclude, “taxes must rise for some properties in 
order to provide relief to others” and “it is obvious…that properties in the cap-eligible group with 
appreciation rates below the assessment cap will always come out behind.” 
  The recent work of Muhammad (2007) evaluates the horizontal and vertical inequities 
resulting from the District of Columbia’s taxable value cap policy which was imposed in 2002.  
District of Columbia’s tax cap policy (TCP) imposed a property value assessment growth limit set 
at 12 percent annually between 2001 and 2005 and 10 percent thereafter.  Over the 2001-2007 
period, median homestead property values more than tripled in the District of Columbia 
($128,499 to $400,050), and this represented an average annual increase of 20.8 percent.  By 
2007 the median property’s final taxable value differed from the actual market value by over 60 
percent.  Muhammad demonstrates the degree of horizontal and vertical inequity resulting from 
the assessment growth limit using data on taxable value and estimated market value for all homes 
in the District of Columbia.  He finds that for homesteads with a value of $600,000, the effective 
millage rate can be as high as $0.79 or as low as $0.01. 
                                                 
10 Dye and McMillen refer to a November 2006 presentation given by Mark Haveman and Paul Wilson at 
the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.    
    
8
  In 2008 the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Haveman and Sexton, 2008) published a 
comprehensive report on property tax assessment limits and their use across the U.S. states.  The 
report covers the institutional/legal aspects of such limits, the implications for the tax base and 
local government autonomy, equity issues, and the inefficiencies that arise.  The report concludes 
by offering potential alternatives to provide property tax relief to those in need.  The authors 
assert that property tax assessment limits are “…the least effective, least equitable, and least 
efficient strategies available for providing tax relief.” 
  We have focused on the most recent literature evaluating the distributional consequences 
of property value assessment growth limits.  We note, however, that the work of Anderson and 
McGuire (2007), Giertz (2006), Bowman (2006), and Youngman (2007), among others provide 
excellent discussions of important issues surrounding the property tax and property tax 
limitations, including assessment growth caps.   There is also a body of research that has 
examined the effects of assessment growth caps on mobility, and more generally there is an 
extensive body of work that has examined interstate migration patterns.  We discuss this research 
next. 
  Mobility and Migration 
In a recent study, Wasi and White (2005) examined the potential lock-in effect for 
housing choice from Proposition 13, using data from 1970 to 2000, and found a significant effect. 
The average tenure length of California homeowners increased by 0.66 years or six percent 
relative to homeowners in Texas and Florida, which were chosen as comparison states.  The 
increase was as high as two to three years in places like San Francisco and San Jose, areas in 
which stable homeowners received the highest subsidies from the assessment growth limit 
embedded in Proposition 13.
11  Ferreira (2004) also examined residential mobility after 
Proposition 13, but focused on the two amendments that allowed transferability of the implicit tax 
                                                 
11 Nagy (1997) also examined the change in household mobility after California’s Proposition 13, using the 
Annual Housing Surveys from 1975, 1978 and 1982.  While he found evidence of a decline in mobility, 
this was not significantly different from similar declines in other parts of the country.    
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benefits to a new home for head of households who are 55 or older.  In a comparison with two 
age groups, he found that mobility for the 55-year old group is about 25 percent higher than the 
mobility for the 54-year old group.  In summary, these studies present empirical evidence for a 
link between California’s assessment growth limit and household mobility. 
  Another strand of the migration literature examines whether state fiscal variables affect 
interstate migration patterns.  The study by Cebula and Alexander (2006) examined the impact of 
economic and non-economic factors on the net state in-migration between 2000 and 2004.  They 
found government spending on primary and secondary education, and state individual income tax 
burden as positive and negative factors, respectively. Clark, Knapp and White (1996) found that 
location characteristics, including fiscal variables, are important determinants of elderly interstate 
migration, but the explanatory power of those variables declines with older age groups. Conway 
and Houtenville (1998, 2001) used state-level data to examine determinants of elderly interstate 
migration and found that fiscal variables play an important role in both in-migration and out-
migration.  Somewhat related is the work of Farnham and Sevak (2002) who provided evidence 
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that moving households reduce their property tax 
liability on average by $115.  This suggests that property taxation plays a role in decisions to 
move. 
In this section we provided a discussion of the literature on property value assessment 
growth caps and their distributional consequences, and the relationship between state/local fiscal 
variables and mobility and migration. While the mobility research is most closely related to the 
present work, to our knowledge no studies have examined the potential impact of the taxable 
value cap on regional migration patterns.  We now turn to the theoretical considerations of 
assessment growth caps in the context of tax base erosion, tax price differentials between long-
time property owners and potential new property owners, and migration patterns.  
 
IV. Theoretical Considerations—Tax Base Erosion and In-Migration    
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When the Michigan assessment growth limit was imposed in 1994, aggregate taxable value for 
each individual property in the state equaled its state equalized value.
12  From 1995 and on, the 
growth of taxable value for any existing property not sold during the period is allowed to grow at 
the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index or five percent, whichever is lower.  
If the state equalized value of properties in a jurisdiction increase at a rate faster than the 
inflation, the ratio of state equalized value (SEV) to taxable value (TV) will begin to rise.  An 
exception is when a property is sold: in this case TV returns to SEV.  If one aggregates to the 
county level, changes over time in SEV/TV will depend on the rates of change in property 
turnover, property prices, and housing stock.  However, property turnover, property prices, and 
housing stock depend on economic and demographic factors. 
  We consider a range of socioeconomic variables that vary by county and over time may 
determine changes in property turnover, property prices, and housing stock and thus tax base 
erosion:  Percent of population between the ages of 0 and 17 (0-17), percent of population 
between 18-24 (18-24), percent of population between 25-44 (25-44), percent of population 
between 45-64 (45-64)
13, , the marriage rate (MARRIAGE), the divorce rate (DIVORCE), the 
mortality rate (MORTALITY), the birth rate (BIRTH), per capita income (PCINC), the rate of 
unemployment (UNEMP), manufacturing employment (MANU), government employment 
(GOV), retail employment (RETAIL), and all other employment (OTHER).
14 
  Age distribution determines housing turnover as well as housing demand, and therefore 
may affect SEV/TV.  For example, generally the young are more likely to move than middle-age 
or older demographic groups.  Major life changing events such as marriage, a birth, divorce, and 
family loss determine both the rate of turnover and housing demand.  To illustrate, the work of 
                                                 
12 State equalized value is defined as 50 percent of estimated market value. 
13 The percent of population that is over the age of 65 is omitted in our empirical analysis to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. 
14 An advantage of county level data is that annual series are available for a wide range of socioeconomic 
and demographic variables, which are unavailable for smaller local government jurisdictions.  It must be 
acknowledged that a disadvantage of using county level data is that aggregation to the county level 
abstracts from tax base erosion differentials across communities within a county.    
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Yu and Liu (2007) shows that divorce increases the number of homes occupied.  While their 
focus was on evaluating the environmental impact of divorce, there is a link to tax base erosion:  
Changes in divorce rates can lead to changes in the demand for homes and housing turnover.  We 
therefore hypothesize that variables that capture major life events are negatively correlated with 
SEV/TV.  We also suggest that these life change variables are appropriate instruments and can be 
used to identify the causal relationship between tax base erosion and migration activity.  The 
validity of these variables as instruments is evaluated and discussed later. 
  Economic conditions are also important.   We expect counties with increasing income 
and reductions in unemployment to experience greater tax base erosion.  Also, the expected 
relationship between employment and SEV/TV is mixed:  Counties experiencing declines in 
manufacturing employment and other employment categories may experience higher turnover 
rates, but home values may also be falling.  The expected impact on SEV/TV is ambiguous. 
  Tax base erosion results in higher tax prices for potential new property owners, relative to 
long-time property owners.  Prior to the imposition of the assessment growth cap in 1994, the 
Headlee revenue growth limit required property tax rate rollbacks (Headlee rollbacks) whenever 
revenues grew faster than the rate of inflation plus new construction.  In fact, Headlee rollbacks 
were very common prior to 1994, and this insured that all property owners enjoyed lower tax 
rates as property values grew.  After 1994, however, rollbacks were reduced both in number and 
magnitude.  Thus, over time new property owners were increasingly required to pay higher tax 
prices than long-time property owners.  Increasing tax prices for new property owners raises the 
cost of public services for this group, and this has the potential to reduce in-migration.  The 
impact of the assessment growth cap, in part, depends on the time preferences and the expected 
time horizon of property ownership.  A new property owner with a low discount rate and who 
expects to hold onto the property for many years may perceive a long-run benefit of the 
assessment growth cap:  He may be willing to pay more today knowing that he is protected from 
future increases in taxes. On the other hand, new property owners with a high discount rate who    
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expects to own the property for only several years will not enjoy the potential tax benefits 
associated with the assessment growth cap.  Therefore, the overall effect of the assessment 
growth cap on in-migration is indeterminate; however, we hypothesize that in-migration will be 
reduced by the assessment growth cap particularly in areas where the tax prices for new property 
owners could have been substantially lower in the absence of the assessment growth cap.
15  All 
else equal, in-migration could be affected in counties that experienced significant tax base 
erosion.
16  We now turn our attention to a critical issue in our evaluation of tax prices and in-
migration patterns—endogeneity. 





 reduces in- 
migration, we must properly address the issue of endogeneity.  While our interest is in 
determining the effect of tax base erosion on in-migration, it must be acknowledged that 











 on in-migration, we must identify instruments and use appropriate estimation 
procedures to address endogeneity.  Keeping in mind that our ultimate goal is to examine the 
relationship between tax base erosion and in-migration, consider the following first-stage reduced 
form tax base erosion equation: 
  () it i it n it n
it
it LIFE b X a
TV
SEV






)) (ln( ) ln( ln      (1) 
                                                 
15 Recall that in absence of the assessment growth cap, areas of high property value growth would have 
experience tax rate rollbacks under the Headlee revenue growth limit. 
16 Note that the difference in the tax rates for new comers and current residents is based on the average rate 
for existing residents.  The marginal difference between a new comer and a given current resident depends 
on the length of time a current resident has lived in his/her home.  In some cases, an existing resident who 
has lived in his/her home since 1994 (the date the assessment growth limit was imposed) might enjoy a tax 
bill that is half that of new comers for similarly valued properties.    
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where Xit is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables as described above, and LIFEit 
represents a vector of life change event variables, µi are county fixed effects, and εit is the error 
term.  In some specifications we also include time indicator variables and county-specific time 
trends. 
  The coefficients from this regression are generated from the within county changes in the 
variables across Michigan counties over the 1994-2006 period.  These estimates are provided for 
the interested reader in the Appendix A.  As we discuss in more detail in the empirical section, 
the vector LIFEit and/or subsets of variables in this vector serve as appropriate instruments in our 
econometric analysis. 
  While we are also interested in the degree to which the taxable value cap has affected 
out-migration, we focus on in-migration because our instruments are most compelling in the case 
of in-migration (the in-migration decision is made by those not currently living within a given 
jurisdiction).  In order to estimate the impact of tax base erosion and on in-migration, we must 
identify appropriate instrument(s) in order to test for endogeneity, and if present use appropriate 
estimation procedures.  Appropriate instruments must be correlated with SEV/TV but not be 
directly correlated with in-migration.  Our analysis suggests that life change events as 
characterized by MARRIAGE, BIRTH, DIVORCE and MORTALITY are appropriate 
instruments.  The identification strategy is based on the idea that these life change variables 
trigger turnover rates and demand for housing, thereby affecting the degree of tax base erosion, 
but these variables are not direct determinants of in-migration. The analysis also shows that at 
least some of these variables are strong instruments in that they are statistically significant and 
meaningful determinants of tax base erosion, but these variables do not directly determine in-
migration.  Also, as discussed in greater detail later, we use alternative combinations of the 
instruments to examine the sensitivity of our findings.  Although we find no empirical evidence to 
support the following notion, one could argue that, particularly, decisions to marry, divorce or 
child birth are influenced by tax base erosion or other economic factors that influence both tax    
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base erosion and in-migration decisions that are not controlled for in our econometric analysis.
17  
If this is the case, these variables would not serve as appropriate instruments.  
  To examine the appropriateness of our instruments, we use the Sargon’s Test of 
Overidentifying Restrictions.  Using different sets of instruments, in each case we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  These examinations suggest that we have 
identified appropriate instruments for the measure of tax base erosion for in-migration analysis.
18  
We also conduct similar tests in the context of out-migration, and again these examinations 
indicate that we have identified appropriate instruments, although we acknowledge we a have a 
weaker theoretical case with out-migration. 
Given that we have appropriate instruments, we next conduct a Hausman test of 
endogeniety.  If the Hausman test of endogeneity indicates that endogeneity is a concern, we must 
use a simultaneous equation procedure.  To complete the Hausman test, the residual generated 
from equation (2) is included as an explanatory variable in the in-migration regression.  If the 
measure of tax base erosion is endogenous, then the coefficient on this residual should be 
significantly different from zero.  The Hausman test for examining the endogeneity of SEV/TV 
suggests that the null hypothesis that SEV/TV is exogenous is rejected.  We therefore proceed 
with estimating the in-migration equation with a correction for simultaneity using a two-stage 
least squares procedure, but for comparison we also present regressions without the correction for 
simultaneity.   
  Before presenting the specification of the second stage regression some additional 
explanation is required.  The specification we use is guided by the following framework.  Let in-
migration be influenced by π, the tax price faced by potential new property owners and a vector 
X, a series of economic and demographic factors that vary within counties over time that may 
                                                 
17 Our analysis also suggests that these instruments are appropriate for out-migration as well. 
18 Specifically, we examined the following combinations of instruments: 1) DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, 
MORTALITY, and BIRTH; 2) MORTALITY, BIRTH, MARRIAGE; 3) MORTALITY, BIRTH; and 4) 
MORTALITY.  We also included TV(-1) as an instrument in a different set of estimations.  In all 
combinations, the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid is not rejected.    
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affect in-migration.  Our primary interest is in determining the degree to which in-migration is 
affected by the tax price faced by the potential in-migrant, which depends on the degree of tax 
base erosion as measured by SEV/TV   However, the tax price faced by new comers is also 
determined by the statutory tax rate as well as the degree to which housing prices, P, differ from 
two times SEV.
 19  Consider the following equation to illustrate the tax price faced by a potential 

























π          ( 2 )  
where the rit is the statutory tax rate and Pit is the ratio of the average housing price in the county. 
Our core hypothesis is that, holding r and P/(2⋅SEV) constant, tax base erosion as measured by 
SEV/TV leads to a higher tax price for new comers and thus deters in-migration. 
  This tax price framework informs the econometric specification because equation (2) 
makes clear that the tax base erosion (SEV/TV) component of the tax price will need to be 
isolated to estimate its effect on in-migration.  Previous research evaluating the role of tax policy 
on migration patterns has used several different specifications.  Conway and Rork (2006), for 
example, use the elderly migration rate as the dependent variable in a linear specification.  On the 
other hand, Conway and Houtenville (2001) use migration flow as the dependent variable in a 
logarithmic specification.  Cebula (1990) and Cebula and Alexander (2006) also use migration 
flow as the dependent variable but in a linear framework.  In the present study, it is convenient to 
use a semi-logarithmic specification in order to separate the components of π and thus isolate the 
effect of tax base erosion associated with the taxable value cap.  The core in-migration 
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19 Recall that SEV is defined as one half of market value.    
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where Inmigit is the migration rate for county i in period t.  In all regressions we control for 
county fixed effects (ai) and a vector of exogenous factors, X it, that vary within counties over 
time that may affect in-migration.  In different sets of regressions we include a set of time 





and other possible 
omitted trends and factors that might be correlated with tax base erosion.











) generated from the first-stage 
regression and its effect on in-migration measured by the coefficient d.   
  We use the two-stage generalized method of moments estimation procedure which is 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The interested reader may review the first 
stage tax base erosion regression results in the Appendix A, but these are not discussed in detail.  
We note, however, that two of the variables that indicate major life events (MARRIAGE and 
MORTALITY) are statistically significant three of four specifications.  The exception is in the 
regression in which when both the time indicator variables and county-specific time trends are 
included in the specification. Higher rates of marriage and mortality result in less tax base 
erosion, perhaps because the rate of home purchases and property turnover is higher.  These 
estimates provide some assurance that these variables will serve as strong instruments.  Further, 
an F-test shows that the combination of the instruments is jointly significant in all regressions, 
and is thus effective as a set. 
  Previous studies of migration flows in an interstate context have focused on the role of 
amenities such as weather conditions, etc… which are largely fixed over our timeframe.  We 
acknowledge that amenities play an important role in intra-state migration patterns.  However, 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, we do not have a reliable time varying county level measure of Pit.  Also, in specifications 
available from the authors upon request we explicitly include the statutory tax rate (r) as an explanatory 
variable, but the inclusion of this variable has virtually no effect our core findings, and r is never 
statistically significant.  We omit r in the specifications presented due to concerns about endogeneity of the 
tax rate variable.     
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such amenities are largely fixed over the period of analysis and therefore we control for amenity 
factors with county fixed effects.  In addition, in some specifications we included time indicator 
variables and county-specific time trends to examine the robustness of our findings.  This 
specification allows us to focus on conditions that have changed within counties over time that 
may affect in-migration:  Socio-economic and fiscal conditions.  Additional details regarding the 
methods of analyses used are discussed next. 
 
V.  Empirical Analysis 
The data are a panel of 982 observations
21 that include all 83 Michigan counties for years 1994 
through 2006.  We estimate fixed effects regressions using a cluster approach in which we cluster 
our standard errors at the county level to address temporal autocorrelation.  Cluster-standard 
errors perform well when the number of clusters is reasonably large (Bertrand et. al., 2004; 
Kezdi, 2004).  However, note that we also used as an alternative estimation approach spatial 
econometric methods in the context of panel data.  In regressions that are not presented but are 
available upon request from the authors, we find that these estimates are qualitatively similar to 
those presented here.
22  Below, we present the regression results which examine the relationship 
between tax base erosion and in-migration. 
  Summary statistics for these and all variables used in the estimations are presented in 
Table 2, and detailed definitions and sources of all variables used in the analysis are shown in the 
Appendix B.  The regressions in columns 1-4 of Table 3 present the estimates without addressing 
                                                 
21 We do not have a complete panel due to some missing/unreported data in our employment variables.  In 
addition the number of observations decreases to 812 in the two-stage least squares estimates because of 
missing data in the life change variables. 
22 While spatial considerations are important, we do not focus on this issue for several reasons.  First, the 
fixed effects account for any spatial patterns that are fixed over time.  Second, we believe temporal 
correlation is a more serious concern.  Last, in our in-migration regressions endogeneity is a potentially 
serious econometric issue.  We therefore believe a fixed effects procedure that addresses temporal serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity is the best overall econometric approach in the context of 
this study.    
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endogeneity, whereas columns (5-8) present the two-stage least squares regressions, using as 
instruments the major life change variables: MARRIAGE, BIRTH, DIVORCE, MORTALITY.   





 variable affects 
in-migration negatively.  These regressions provide evidence that tax base erosion is inversely 
correlated with in-migration.  However, the standard error of the tax base erosion variable is 





 maintains statistical significance when either time indicator variables or county-specific 
time trends are included, but the coefficient falls below the standards of statistical significance 
when both are included.  Regardless, the magnitude of the coefficient is reasonably consistent 
across this set of regressions.  It is not too surprising that once statewide trends and county-
specific trends are controlled for that precision of the estimates fall.  Overall, these estimates 
suggest that counties with greater tax base erosion experience less in-migration, controlling for 
other factors.   While the inclusion of count-specific time trends reduces the potential for omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity, these estimates may still be plagued by simultaneity.  We therefore 
present a series of two-stage least squares estimates in columns 5-8. 






 is now considerably larger, and indication that any potential bias resulting 
from simultaneity appears to be toward zero.  When both time indicator variables and county-





again falls below 
typical standards statistical significance.    
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To provide a sense of the estimated effects of tax base erosion on in-migration, consider 











ln  from column (6), a 





 from its mean value is predicted reduce in-migration 
by about 32 percent.





 represents an 17 percent 
differential in tax price between a older protected homeowner and a potential new homeowner.  
In this context, the estimated in-migration response seems quite large. The coefficient estimates 
generated from the regressions that do not correct for endogeneity (columns 1-4) are much 






predicted to reduce in-migration between 8 and 15 percent.  Although our examinations suggest 
that our instruments are valid and that endogeneity is present, we still have concerns about the 
instruments.  Furthermore, as illustrated above the instrumental variables approach generates 
estimates that seem too large.  For these reasons, we tend to favor the more conservative OLS 
estimates.  
Turning to the control variables, we see that the coefficients on per capita income are 
positive and consistently significant. The coefficients on unemployment are negative but not 
always significant.  Similarly, some of the coefficients on the employment variables, particularly 
retail and other employment, are consistently negative and sometimes significant. While a high-
concentration of a particular population age group could be a contributing factor to county in-
                                                 
23 From column (6), the coefficient on ln(SEV/TV) is 0.12.  The mean value and standard deviation of 
SEV/TV are 1.22 and 0.167, respectively.   The average annual in-migration rate is 0.048.  Therefore, a one 
standard deviation increase in SEV/TV is predicted to reduce in-migration by the coefficient estimate 
multiplied by the (initial ln(SEV/TV) minus new ln(SEV/TV)), or 0.12x0.127=0.0152.  This is roughly a 
32 percent reduction in in-migration.    
    
20
migration (e.g. retiree in-migration to counties with more elderly population), we generally do not 
find the demographic variables to be significant determinants of in-migration. 
Robustness 
To examine the robustness and sensitivity of the core finding, we consider a range of 
issues.  First, in regressions not reported but are available from the authors upon request, we 
included the aggregate statutory tax rate as an additional explanatory variable in the regressions.
24  
None of our core conclusions are altered with the inclusion of the statutory rate variable.  We also 





 interacted with the statutory rate variable, treating the interaction 
term as endogenously determined.  In these regressions we find that the effect of tax base erosion 
on in-migration is most pronounced in areas with relatively high tax rates.
25  In other regressions 
we use lagged explanatory variables; again our core finding is unaltered.  We examined the 
sensitivity of the two-stage least squares estimates by using different combinations of 
instruments.  These findings are generally consistent with those presented here.  We estimated 
two alternative specifications that have been used in previous research on migration:  1) a linear 
specification; and 2) a log-log specification.  Again, our core findings are robust to these 
considerations.  Finally, we examined the effect of tax base erosion on in-migration in the context 
of a system of equations that include in-migration, out-migration, and new construction.  We 
estimate this system using a three-stage least squares estimation procedure, and these are 
available from the authors upon request.
26  The in-migration results are very similar to those 
presented here.  
                                                 
24 We exclude the statutory rate variable in the regressions we present because we recognize the difficulties 
associated with the potential endogeneity of property tax rate changes and migration decisions. 
25 Conversely, one could interpret this result as indicating the higher tax rates reduce in-migration more in 
areas where tax base erosion is highest.  These results are available upon request from the authors. 
26 One drawback of this econometric approach, however, is that we are unable to address autocorrelation 
with the clustering technique.  Thus, in these estimates the standard errors are biased downward, leading to 
inflated t values.      
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Although the focus of this research is on the relationship between tax base erosion and in-
migration, in Appendix C we also present a series of out-migration regressions. This set of 
regressions is analogous to those in Table 3 except that the dependent variable is out-migration.  
We are more cautious in our interpretation of these findings because the life change variables we 
use as instruments are arguably not purely exogenous to out-migration decisions.
27  The set of 
regressions reveals no consistent relationship between out-migration and tax base erosion, 
although we note that our most rigorous specification in which we correct for simultaneity and 
control for time indicator variables and county-specific time trends indicates that tax base erosion 
has reduced out-migration. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
The work presented in this paper evaluates the degree to which tax base erosion and 
corresponding differential in tax prices between potential property owners and long-time property 
owners has affected in-migration.  To our knowledge, this is the first such formal analysis of the 
migration effects of differential tax base erosion resulting from a property value assessment 
growth cap.  Other factors such as changing economic circumstances have arguably played a 
much stronger role in location decisions.  On the margin, however, home seekers appear to be 
influenced by the peculiar fiscal environment associated with property tax assessment growth 
limits. 
  Over the past two and half years, home values have fallen across Michigan, but the rate 
of decline varies across regions.  The analysis presented here may also be useful for 
understanding the differential impacts of falling home values in terms of reversing the tax base 
                                                 
27 Although we are cautious with our interpretation, note that Sargon’s Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
suggests that the instruments are valid for the out-migration analysis.  The Hausman test provides evidence 
of endogeneity in the context of out-migration.  Thus, instrumental variable procedures are appropriate.    
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erosion.
28  Legislators, aware of the high effective property tax rates associated with tax base 
erosion caused by the taxable value cap, have considered implementing a new income tax credit 
for new homeowners to offset the “pop up” property tax increase.  While not an ideal solution, 
the debate suggests that legislators are becoming aware of the implications of the taxable value 
cap.  In Michigan, however, substantial revisions or possible repeal of the taxable value cap 
would require voter approval. 
  One implication of falling home values is that the distortions caused by the taxable value 
cap are being reduced.  It would seem then that analysis of such distortions is less relevant.  
However, our examination sheds light on the effects of the taxable value cap at an opportune 
time.  Reductions in property values mean that long-time homeowners who might otherwise have 
much to lose by the elimination of the taxable value cap may not object to its repeal in the current 
environment.  In a political economy framework, there is no time better than now to consider the 
elimination of poorly conceived constraints such as the taxable value cap.  In 1994, the taxable 
value cap was approved by voters under the premise that it would further limit property taxation.  
However, it is very likely that many voters did not fully understand that such a constraint would 
ultimately lead to significant tax reductions for some at the expense of higher taxes for new 
property owners.  Under current conditions, fewer voters have immediate losses resulting from a 
change in the law, and its repeal would avoid potential future distortions. 
  There are two limitations of this analysis that should be acknowledged.  First, due to data 
limitations the unit of analysis is conducted at the county level and therefore necessarily abstracts 
from tax base erosion differentials that may exist in more narrowly defined jurisdictions.  One 
advantage of county level data, however, is that we are able to incorporate into the analysis more 
detailed socio-economic variables that are not available for smaller jurisdictions on an annual 
basis.  A second limitation is that it is possible that assessment growth caps may have a 
                                                 
28 Since 2007, Michigan counties have experienced significant losses in property value and there has been a 
reversal such that SEV/TV is now decreasing.    
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capitalization effect on property values, but the direction and degree of capitalization is unclear.  
For property owners who expect to hold onto their property for many years, the taxable value cap 
represents a potential long-run benefit:  They may pay higher taxes today, but tax liabilities are 
guaranteed to grow at the rate of inflation and will not exceed five percent.
29  The capitalization 
of tax payments, including lower future payments, for the duration of tenure in the home may 
lead to a higher willingness to pay for such property owners.  However, for property owners who 
do not expect to hold on to property for an extended number of years or are not able to anticipate 
how long he or she may own property, the taxable value growth cap merely represents higher 
overall tax prices (O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin, 1995).  These property owners may very 
well be willing to pay less for property under the taxable value growth cap.  In addition, if 
mobility is reduced because of the taxable value growth cap as suggested by previous studies, 
fewer homes might be available on the market and this may lead to higher housing prices.  It 
should also be noted that because of the Headlee revenue growth limit, it is likely that the overall 
revenue growth and thus average tax prices would not be significantly different in the absence of 
the taxable value cap. 
  Despite these limitations, the current work provides new evidence regarding the 
implications of tax base erosion, emerging differential in tax prices between potential new 
property owners and long-time property owners and in-migration.  Future work aimed at 
explicitly identifying the implications of the taxable value cap on the redistribution of property 
tax payments across demographic groups will be a valuable contribution. 
 
                                                 
29 In an environment of rising home values, this may be very comforting.  However, recently home values 
have actually fallen, and taxable values are by law increasing by the rate of inflation.  An exception is for 
homeowners whose state equalized value no longer exceeds taxable value:  For these properties, taxable 
value falls with state equalized value.    
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Figure 1 
Ratio of State Equalized Value to Taxable Value, 2006 
 
 
Source:  State of Michigan Department of Treasury. 
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Table 1 
Average Statewide Millage Rates 
 
Calendar Homestead    Nonhomestead  All 
 Year   Property   Property     Property 
 1990     57.17      57.17      57.17 
 1991     57.34    57.34      57.34 
 1992     58.09      58.09    58.09 
 1993     56.64      56.64    56.64 
 1994     30.22      48.17      38.19 
 1995     31.00      48.79      38.88 
 1996     31.36      49.54      39.32 
 1997     31.36      49.63      39.25 
 1998     31.43      49.68      39.27 
 1999     31.40      49.76      39.16 
 2000     31.54      50.10      39.32 
 2001     32.12      50.72      39.78 
 2002     32.60      51.00      40.17 
 2003     31.52      50.06      39.00 
 2004     32.70      51.20      40.00 
    2005       32.60      51.38        39.88 
    2006     32.66      51.38      39.96 
 
Source: All Property Millage Rates from State Tax Commission except 1994; CY 1994 All 
Property Rate and Homestead and Non-homestead millage rates from the Tax Analysis Division, 
Michigan Department of Treasury. 
    








of   
Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev. 
In-migration/Population  982  0.048            0.026 
Out-migration/Population  982  0.045            0.025 
 
SEV/TV  982            1.23            0.168 
Population 982  11,950  27,860 
Percent o Population Between 0-17  982          24.32            2.748 
Percent of the Population between 
the Ages of 18 and 24  982             9.03            3.61 
Percent of the Population between 
the Ages of 25 and 44  982           27.27            2.99 
Percent of the Population between 
the Ages of 45 and 64  982           24.15            2.88 
Percent of Population Over 65  982           15.22           4.01 
 
Marriage  982           14.81           3.83 
Birth  812           11.48           2.01 
Divorce  982             8.19           2.24 
Mortality  982             9.95           2.44 
 
Per Capita Income*  982  24,011   3,700 
Unemployment Rate  982            8.62           1.78 
Manuf, Emp. Per Capita  982            0.085           0.131 
Gov’t Emp. Per Capita  982            0.080           0.058 
Retail Emp. Per Capita  982            0.083           0.058 
Other Emp. Per Capita  982            0.268           0.159 
Statutory Property Tax Rate  982         36.05           4.60 
 
*Monetary values in thousands of nominal dollars    
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Table 3 
In-migration Regression Results 
(t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses) 
  Dependent Variable:  In-migration Rate 
 




































Ln(SEV/TV) -0.04***  -0.03*  -0.06***  -0.04 -0.20**  -0.12*  -0.22*  -0.14 
 (-3.208)  (-1.723)  (-2.699)  (-1.305)  (-2.391) (-1.927)  (-1.663)  (-1.444) 
Ln(Per Capita Income)  0.04071***  0.07452*** 0.08316*** 0.12189*** 0.10187** 0.07865***  0.08054*  0.04447*** 
 (3.001)  (3.980)  (2.887)  (3.106)  (2.397) (4.208)  (1.708)  (3.691) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002***  -0.001* -0.001  0.000 
 (-2.528)  (-1.892)  (-1.367)  (-1.496)  (-3.216) (-1.845)  (-1.212)  (0.263) 
Ln(Manuf. Emp. Per Capita)  0.001  -0.002  -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005  -0.006  -0.002 
 (0.282)  (-0.701)  (-0.857)  (-1.135)  (-1.399) (-1.576)  (-1.178)  (-0.846) 
Ln(Gov’t Emp. Per Capita)  0.004  0.000 -0.010 -0.011 0.012 0.003  0.011  -0.005 
 (0.513)  (0.00680)  (-0.664)  (-0.753)  (0.950) (0.322)  (0.541) (-0.435) 
Ln(Retail Emp. Per Capita)  -0.008**  -0.005 -0.011** -0.010  -0.014***  -0.009** -0.004  0.000 
 (-2.545)  (-1.000)  (-2.257)  (-1.526)  (-3.731) (-2.233)  (-1.217)  (0.0899) 
Ln(Other Emp. Per Capita)  -0.020***  -0.023*** -0.024**  -0.023* -0.019***  -0.020***  -0.010  -0.003 
 (-3.200)  (-2.922)  (-2.277)  (-1.812)  (-3.074) (-4.105)  (-1.351)  (-0.448) 
Ln(Age under 18)  0.016  0.005  0.044  -0.069 -0.063  -0.062*  0.071 -0.095** 
 (1.015)  (0.285)  (0.735)  (-0.981)  (-1.133) (-1.776)  (1.435)  (-2.233) 
Ln(Age 18-24)  -0.008  -0.007  -0.011 -0.013 0.031 0.001  0.045  -0.017 
 (-0.873)  (-0.743)  (-0.464)  (-0.644)  (1.170) (0.0765)  (1.026)  (-1.147) 
Ln(Age 25-44)  0.006  0.026  -0.016  -0.057 0.025 0.010  -0.029  -0.070*** 
 (0.353)  (1.465)  (-0.490)  (-1.433)  (0.604) (0.356) (-0.697) (-2.678) 
Ln(Age 45- 64)  -0.011  0.036**  -0.030 -0.017 0.022 0.006  0.044 -0.094* 
 (-0.712)  (2.103)  (-0.618)  (-0.391)  (0.670) (0.166)  (0.703) (-1.937) 
Adjusted R
2 0.904  0.908  0.920  0.923  -0.121 0.383  -0.791  0.002 
Time Indicator Variables  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes 
County-specific Time Trend  No No  Yes  Yes  No  No Yes  Yes 
N 982  982  982  982  812  812  812  812 
a Instruments:  Marriage, Birth, Divorce, Mortality 
Notes:  All regressions include county fixed effects; * Indicates significance at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.; ** Indicates significance at the 95 
percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** Indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.    




Tax Base Erosion Regression Results 
(t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses) 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(SEV/TV) 
 












Ln(Per Capita Income)  0.46***  0.11  0.30**  0.01 
  (6.221) (1.054) (2.470) (0.104) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.00637*** -0.00729***  -0.00228  -0.00033 
  (-2.859) (-2.639) (-1.087) (-0.140) 
Ln(Manuf. Emp. Per Capita) -0.038*  -0.018  -0.033*  -0.011 
  (-1.710) (-0.866) (-1.972) (-0.689) 
Ln(Gov’t Emp. Per Capita)  0.063  0.053  0.073  -0.010 
 (1.179)  (1.218)  (1.244)  (-0.184) 
Ln(Retail Emp. Per Capita) -0.043**  -0.005  -0.005  0.009 
 (-2.350)  (-0.187)  (-0.419)  (0.416) 
Ln(Other Emp. Per Capita) 0.010  0.007  -0.031 -0.010 
 (0.311)  (0.236)  (-1.219)  (-0.354) 
Ln(Age under 18)  -0.430**  -0.360**  0.172  -0.038 
  (-2.533) (-2.355) (0.498) (-0.169) 
Ln(Age 18-24)  0.286***  0.145**  0.336***  0.092 
  (3.555) (2.207) (3.706) (1.212) 
Ln(Age 25-44)  0.282  0.116  -0.080  -0.005 
 (1.360)  (0.561)  (-0.313)  (-0.0211) 
Ln(Age 45- 64)  0.233  -0.363*  0.350  -0.329* 
  (1.383) (-1.939) (1.621) (-1.688) 
Ln(Marriage)  -0.025 -0.023** -0.015 -0.018** 
  (-1.636) (-2.135) (-1.295) (-2.021) 
Ln(Birth) -0.045**  -0.051***  -0.018  -0.004 
  (-2.099) (-2.767) (-1.138) (-0.309) 
Ln(Divorce)  -0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.890)  (-1.571)  (0.0732)  (-0.697) 
Ln(Mortality)  -0.013 0.002 -0.016 0.013 
  (-0.644) (0.0853) (-1.039)  (1.059) 
Adjusted R
2  0.931 0.950 0.975 0.983 
Time Indicator Variables No Yes No Yes 
County-specific Time Trend  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  812 812 812 812 
a Instruments:  ln(Marriage), ln(Birth), ln(Divorce), ln(Mortality)  
Notes:  All regressions include county fixed effects; * Indicates significance at the 90 percent confidence level 
for a two-tailed test.; ** Indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** 
Indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.    
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Appendix B 
Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variables    Definitions   Source 
In-migration 
 Migration into a county (based on tax return 
data)/population 
 CENSUS   
and SOI 
Out-migration 
 Migration out of a county (based on tax return 
data)/population 
 CENSUS   
and SOI 
SEV 
 County aggregate state equalized value, which is equal ½ 
of estimated market value 
 MDT 
TV 
 County aggregate taxable value which is allowed to grow 
at the rate of inflation unless a property is sold (selling 
property returns taxable value to state equalized value) 
 MDT 
SEV/TV 
 Ratio of aggregate state equalized value to aggregate 
taxable value in the county 
 MDT 
Population 
 County population plus in-migration minus out-migration    CENSUS  
and SOI 
Percent of Population 
Between 0-17 
 Percent of the population between the ages of zero and 17    CENSUS 
Percent of Population 
between 18-24 
 Percent of the population between the ages of 18 and 24    CENSUS 
Percent of Population 
between 25-44 
 Percent of the population between the ages of 25 and 44    CENSUS 
Percent of Population 
between 45-64 
 Percent of the population between the ages of 45 and 64    CENSUS 
Percent of Population Over 
65 
 Percent of the population aged 65 and older    CENSUS 
Marriage   Marriage rate per 1,000 population    MDCH 
Birth   Birth rate per 1,000 population    MDCH 
Divorce   Divorce rate per 1,000 population     MDCH 
Mortality   Mortality rate per 1,000 population    MDCH 
        
Per Capita Income   Per capita income    BEA 
Unemployment Rate   The rate of unemployment    BEA 
Manuf, Emp. Per Capita   Employment in manufacturing per capita    BEA 
Gov’t Emp. Per Capita   Employment in government per capita     BEA  
Retail Emp. Per Capita   Employment in retail per capita     BEA  
Other Emp. Per Capita   Employment in all other categories per capita     BEA  
Per Capita New 
Construction 
 The value of new construction per capita    BEA 
Statutory Property Tax 
Rate= Effective Rate for 
New Resident 
 Average statutory rate in the county for all overlying 
taxing jurisdictions (township, village, city, community 
college, and county) 
 MDT 
Sources: 
BEA:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Accounts Data: http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/reis/ 
CENSUS: U.S. Census Bureau, County Population Estimates: http://eire.census.gov/popest/estimates.php 
MDT:  Michigan Department of Treasury 
MDCH:  Michigan Department of Community Health 
SOI:  Statistics of Income, Internal Revenue Service, US Federal Government
30 
 
                                                 
30 The Internal Revenue Service collects detailed annual information on the number of in-migrants and out-
migrants by county on an annual basis.  These data are based on address and changes provided by tax filers.    
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Appendix C 
Out-migration Regression Results 
(t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent  Variable:   Out-migration Rate 
 




































Ln(SEV/TV) -0.00  0.01  -0.04**  -0.03 0.01 0.00  -0.05 -0.18* 
 (-0.193)  (0.648)  (-2.433)  (-1.055)  (0.217) (0.0356) (-0.691)  (-1.705) 
Ln(Per Capita Income)  0.03299**  0.03866** 0.06190**  0.07928*  0.00996 0.03901***  0.00586  0.01179 
 (2.589)  (2.344)  (2.331)  (1.911)  (0.417) (4.132)  (0.212)  (0.722) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.001*  -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000  -0.000  0.000 
 (-1.779)  (-1.210)  (-0.0628)  (-0.201)  (-0.196) (0.289)  (-0.177)  (0.628) 
Ln(Manuf. Emp. Per Capita)  -0.004  -0.004 -0.005  -0.008*  -0.002  -0.004* -0.001  -0.004 
 (-1.341)  (-1.527)  (-1.382)  (-1.690)  (-0.588) (-1.790)  (-0.465)  (-1.262) 
Ln(Gov’t Emp. Per Capita)  0.009  0.009 0.012 0.014  -0.003  -0.002 0.008  0.004 
 (0.722)  (0.659)  (0.531)  (0.563)  (-0.373) (-0.247)  (0.688)  (0.277) 
Ln(Retail Emp. Per Capita)  -0.003  -0.003 -0.003  -0.007*  -0.002  -0.009* 0.003  0.002 
 (-0.762)  (-0.383)  (-0.903)  (-1.683)  (-0.665) (-1.781)  (0.762)  (0.330) 
Ln(Other Emp. Per Capita)  -0.018**  -0.020** -0.014  -0.016 -0.016**  -0.015**  0.004  0.004 
 (-2.402)  (-2.021)  (-1.587)  (-1.323)  (-2.249) (-2.239)  (0.503)  (0.433) 
Ln(Age under 18)  0.058***  0.082**  0.011  0.043 0.040** 0.027  0.017  -0.013 
 (2.893)  (2.536)  (0.223)  (0.498)  (2.048) (1.354)  (0.435) (-0.269) 
Ln(Age 18-24)  0.014  0.017**  -0.005 0.014 -0.002 0.012  0.016  0.037* 
 (1.625)  (2.305)  (-0.189)  (0.686)  (-0.0986) (0.920)  (0.498)  (1.676) 
Ln(Age 25-44)  0.048**  0.052**  0.092*** 0.085*  0.017  0.031  0.094***  0.070 
 (2.147)  (2.394)  (2.787)  (1.790)  (0.654) (1.550)  (2.773)  (1.400) 
Ln(Age 45- 64)  0.007  0.036*  0.045 0.098** 0.002 0.051**  0.075  0.041 
 (0.432)  (1.848)  (0.843)  (2.205)  (0.0784) (2.067)  (1.639)  (0.666) 
Adjusted R
2 0.890  0.893  0.917  0.919  0.112 0.208  0.060 -0.263 
Time Indicator Variables  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes 
County-specific Time Trend  No No  Yes  Yes  No  No Yes  Yes 
N 982  982  982  982  812  812  812  812 
a Instruments:  Marriage, Birth, Divorce, Mortality 
Notes:  All regressions include county fixed effects; * Indicates significance at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.; ** Indicates significance at the 95 
percent confidence level for a two-tailed test; *** Indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
 